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CASE COMMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW-INSANE PERSONS-COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL.
-Three recent federal cases will be considered in this comment.
1. Appellant was indicted for felonies in violation of federal
statutes and was found mentally incompetent to stand trial. After
commitment to an institution he was released by writ of habeas
corpus in which proceeding he was adjudicated sane. He was taken
into custody, and at trial the United States attorney moved for a
determination of appellant's competency to stand trial; following
a hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1949), the court ruled appellant
mentally competent. He was convicted and sentenced and no
appeal was taken. Appellant filed present motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1952), to vacate the sentences, and the district court over-
ruled the motion without a hearing but with a written opinion.
This appeal followed. Held, that the issue of competency was a
factual issue raised and adjudicated in the trial court and subject
to review on appeal. Not being an "exceptional" case in which
there had been a fundamental miscarriage of justice, it cannot now
be collaterally attacked. Motion denied. Hill v. United States,
223 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1955).
2. The appellant had been convicted of murder in the first
degree and sentenced to death in 1938. Prior to trial a psychiatrist
had examined appellant at the instance of the United States at-
torney and found him to be of low intelligence but not of a sufficient
degree to affect his "responsibility". Appellant was adjudged
insane and committed to a hospital in 1940. In May 1952 the
President commuted the sentence to life imprisonment; in Novem-
ber 1952 appellant was certified to have recovered his reason and
returned to prison. He then made this motion to vacate the judg-
ment of conviction on the ground, among others, that he was not
mentally competent to stand trial in 1938. At the hearing the
district court, after considering the evidentiary material in the
record, made a finding of appellant's competency to have stood
trial and denied the motion to vacate. Held, that the issue was
competency and the district court's conclusion was a direct finding
from the evidence as disclosed by the file and the record. There
was substantial evidence from which the district court could find,
as it did, that appellant was competent at the time of the trial.
Motion denied. Bishop v. United States, 223 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir.
1955).
3. This was a hearing to determine the mental competency
of D who was serving sentence after conviction of felonies. Such
hearing is made mandatory by 18 U.S.C. § 4245 (1949) upon cer-
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tification by the director of bureau of prisons that there is probable
cause to believe that an accused, found to be insane during service
of sentence, was mentally incompetent when he was tried. Psy-
chiatrists, serving on the board of examiners at a federal prison
where D was first imprisoned and at federal medical center to which
he was later committed, made the report upon which the director
based his certification; they testified that the report meant, in their
opinion, that D was probably psychotic at the time of the trial.
A psychiatrist who had made a pre-trial examination and the
arresting officers testified that D was of sound mind prior to his
trials in 1953. The records of D's trials were consulted and studied
by the court and testimony of the psychiatrists concerning matters
therein was received. Held, that D was mentally competent at the
time of trial. The testimony of the psychiatrists who examined D
subsequent to conviction amounted to an opinion that he probably
was psychotic at the time of trial and other expert testimony
indicates, (a) that the testimony at D's trials contains nothing
suggesting a psychosis at that time, and (b) that no one can posi-
tively say when D's present mental illness developed into a psychosis.
Even assuming that the beginning of D's illness could be traced back
to events prior to trial, it had not reached a stage at the time of
trial to render him mentally incompetent. United States v. Fooks,
132 F. Supp. 533 (D.C. Dist. 1955).
The rule prohibiting trial of an insane person charged with
a crime has long been a part of the common law, and more
recently of constitutional and statutory law. Ashley v. Pescor, 147
F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1945). The purpose of the rule is to avoid the
violation of due process, and to prevent the unfairness inherent
in the criminal conviction of one who is actually incapable of
making a rational defense. The determination of competency to
stand trial depends upon one's capability of making a rational
defense and involves the elements of comprehension of position,
appreciation of the charges made, and ability to render one's
attorneys such assistance as a proper defense demands. See Annot.,
3 A.L.R. 94 (1919). It has been held that if a person measures
up to these standards, he is competent to stand trial even though
on some other subjects his mind may be deranged or unsound.
In re Buchanan, 129 Cal. 330, 61 Pac. 1120 (1900); see People v.
Perry, 14 Cal. 2d 587, 94 P.2d 559, 565 (1939).
The common law and many statutes provide a mechanism for
determination of competency to stand trial in the form of a hear-
ing, held for such purpose after the court in its discretion deter-
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mines the necessity for such inquiry, at which a jury is impaneled
to hear evidence on the issue of competency. W. VA. CODE c. 62,
art. 3, § 9 (Michie 1955). To the effect that our statute is declara-
tory generally of the common law, see State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va.
729, 738, 15 S.E. 982 (1892). See Annot. 142 A.L.R. 961 (1943).
The broad discretion allowed the trial court under the common
law and most of these statutes is not present under the federal
procedure. There it is provided that upon motion for determina-
tion of competency to stand trial made by the United States
attorney, by the accused or by the court itself, the court shall cause
an examination by one psychiatrist and if there is an indication of
insanity, shall upon notice hold a hearing. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1949).
Such was the procedure followed in Hill v. United States, supra,
at which the finding of competency was made based on current
evidence presented. In spite of diligence at this point in the pro-
ceedings it must be recognized that there is still a real possibility
that a mental incompetent may be tried and convicted. Therefore,
18 U.S.C. § 4245 (1949) provides for a mandatory hearing to deter-
mine whether an accused was competent to have stood trial when
such accused is found insane after having been sentenced where
"there is cause to believe that such person was mentally incom-
petent at the time of his trial", provided that the issue was not
raised and determined before or during the trial. Id. § 4245.
In Bishop v. United States, supra, the only hearing held was
one on motion to vacate-fifteen years after the trial. Here the
court had to make a finding of competency based on the record. It
is required that such determination be supported by findings of
fact to be stated by the trial court. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952). As
the dissent in Bishop v. United States pointed out, inferences of
fact were drawn from the evidence and files without the aid of
psychiatric adivce. Id. at 592. The court inferred from (1)
Bishop's own testimony at the time of the trial, (2) Doctor Evans'
pre-trial examination (which was merely tentative, its finality
depending on a report on results of a psychometric examination),
and (3) Bishop's recovery of his sanity after the commutation of
the death sentence, that there was no basis for an inference of
incompetency at the time of the trial. Id. at 585, 586. These in-
ferences were doubtful, if not erroneous, when considered in the
light of the material in the record and the findings made in a sub-
sequent psychiatric examination, viz., (1) Doctor Evans had made
a pre-trial examination of the accused and it is not dear, when using
the word "responsibility", whether he was referring to accused's
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mental condition at the time of the offense or at the time of trial,
(2) The reports of Doctors Klein and Overholser, based on examina-
tion subsequent to the trial, both agreed that accused was feeble
minded and mentally deficient. Id. at 590, 591. The dissent ad-
vocated that another hearing be held at which the trial court would
be required to make specific findings of fact from additional evi-
dence to be there presented.
In meeting the same problem of subsequent determination of
competency a New York court based the grant of a new trial on
clinical examinations made after the accused had been convicted,
and disregarded evidence in the record of accused's rational con-
duct at the trial. People v. Wolfe, 102 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Kings Co.
1951). The grant of a new trial was later reversed, 278 App. Div.
967, 105 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2d Dep't 1951), affid 303 N.Y. 752, 103 N.E.2d
540 (1952). Thus a divergence of opinion is evident as to what
constitutes the better basis for the determination of competency
when the issue is not raised at the trial but subsequent thereto, i.e.,
dependence upon, (1) a review of the record, or (2) clinical examina-
tion. The New York court has been criticized for substituting
"medical concepts for legal concepts". Comment, 12 U. PiTT. L.
REv. 629 (1951). In Bishop v. United States, legal concepts, i.e.,
a purely legalistic review of the record, unaided by psychiatric
advice, caused a denial of accused's motion. The question here
would seem to be whether a really rational determination of ac-
cused's competency was possible under the circumstances surround-
ing the trial court's action. Even though the appellate court had
no "definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been com-
mitted" by the lower court in its handling of the situation, might
not a mistake be inherent in the very nature of the procedure used
to determine the issue? It is felt that a much fairer and more
rational determination of the issue of competency could be made
at a hearing held for that purpose at which current evidence is
heard, rather than by reference to often unclear and incomplete
matters in the record-here, of a fifteen year old case. By "current"
is meant evidence, probative of the issue of competency, substan-
tiated by past and present psychiatric inquiry, and considering
later clues to the accused's prior competency as well as record
material of events occurring prior to and at the trial. In setting
forth the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 4245, supra, the committee stated,
"Based upon past experience, the percentage of convicts in the first
classification, [note: those certified by the director of the bureau
of prisons, during service of sentence, to be of unsound mind] is
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large enough to justify the belief that mental disturbance of a
psychotic nature existed at the time of the trial and before." (1949)
U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1929. Although mere psychosis is not
enough to make one incompetent-under the "rational defense"
test noted above-to stand trial, this statement does indicate a
realization of the problem of subsequent determination of com-
petency.
Ideally then, the insanity of an accused, as affecting his com-
petency to stand trial, should be tested at the time of such trial,
e.g., under 18 U.S.C. § 4244, as in Hill v. United States. ALI CODE
CGim. PROC. § 307 (1931). Since, due to various reasons, this is not
always accomplished, a rational method of deterriination at a time
subsequent to the trial is required. The purely legalistic review
of the record in Bishop v. United States, as it is pointed out above,
leaves much to be desired.
In United States v. Fooks, supra, the court, aided by psychiatric
advice in the form of expert testimony, based its findings upon a
combined consideration of the records of D's trials and upon psy-
chiatric examinations subsequent thereto. Id. at 535, 536. Both
current evidence and record material were fully utilized. If current
and probative reports are also relied upon then, proper results
can be reached even under the requirement of Bishop v. United
States that the record be utilized in the determination. The pro-
cedure followed by the court in United States v. Foohs would seem
to be more fruitful in reaching the basic issue of competency to
stand trial than a subsequent view only of stale and often incom-
plete records of trial. If it is a desirable policy not to subject
persons who are incapable of understanding their positions to trial
and punishment, then it is as necessary to have an accurate and fair
method of subsequently determining their competency as it is to
have a like procedure prior to or concurrent with the trial.
B. F. D.
EMINENT DOMAIN-FEDERAL CONDEMNATION J1UDGMENTS-DocK-
ETING AND INDEXING WITH STATE RECORDs.-Federal government
obtained timber land in a condemnation proceeding. The judg-
ment was correctly docketed and indexed with the clerk of the
federal district court. It also was docketed in the office of the
county clerk but was indexed and cross indexed without the name
of one of the parties. Under the state law this was necessary in order
to give a subsequent purchaser constructive notice of judgment
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